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Abstract
Some of the largest listed firms in Western and Northern Europe are partly owned by 
foundations. So far, little research exists about the shareholder value effects of founda-
tion ownership. This study aims to close this gap using an event study method. We 
find that equity markets show a positive reaction following the announcement by a 
foundation that it intends to decrease its ownership share, whereas we find no reaction 
when a foundation announces that it intends to increase its ownership share. The posi-
tive reaction to an announcement of an ownership share decrease is particularly strong 
when a foundation holds an equity stake of less than 25%. Further investigations show 
that our findings are specific for foundations as blockholders and do not occur with 
other blockholders. Overall, our study shows that equity markets are skeptical about 
foundations as shareholders. Future research is needed to determine whether this skep-
ticism is due to monitoring problems of foundations, goal divergences between foun-
dations and firms, foundations being hybrid organizations with multiple goals, or legal 
restrictions that come with this particular form of firm ownership.
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1 Introduction
Foundation-owned firms are firms that are partly or fully owned by charitable 
or private foundations. In Germany, for example, more than 400 foundation-
owned firms exist, and a strong increase can be observed over the last 10 years 
(Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 2012). Some foundation-owned firms like 
Bosch, Bertelsmann, and Würth, are global players and are very important for 
their respective regions or countries. Some of those foundation-owned firms are 
also listed on the stock market (e.g., Carl Zeiss, Thyssenkrupp, Erste Bank, and 
Kuoni).
So far, however, we know little about the shareholder value effects of founda-
tion ownership. This is an important oversight, as foundations differ from other 
blockholders in important aspects. For instance, foundations usually lack residual 
claimants (Franke and Draheim 2015). This can result in problems monitoring 
the management of the firm and can increase agency costs. The lack of a residual 
claimant and the agency problems associated with it can also lead to a stronger 
stakeholder and employee orientation (Børsting and Thomsen 2017; Franke and 
Draheim 2015). Furthermore, foundations may face higher legal restrictions than 
other blockholders. In several cases, foundations are bound by their charter to 
always retain a majority of shares or voting rights in the firm. Finally, some foun-
dations have charitable purposes. This can lead to conflicts of interest between 
the foundation’s charitable and the firm’s economic goals.
Our study investigates the shareholder value effects of foundation ownership. 
We focus on announcements made by foundations to increase or decrease their 
firm ownership shares and use an event study method to determine shareholder 
value effects. We find that equity markets show a positive reaction following a 
foundation’s announcement to decrease its ownership share, whereas we find no 
reaction following a foundation’s announcement to increase its ownership share. 
In the next step, we analyze the announcements of non-foundation blockhold-
ers in our sample of foundation-owned firms. The results show strong differ-
ences between foundation and non-foundation blockholders in the shareholder 
value effects of ownership share related announcements, supporting the view that 
equity markets view foundations as a special group of blockholders. Comparing 
foundation-owned firms with foundation ownership above 25% with foundation-
owned firms where the foundation holds less than 25% of equity, we find that the 
shareholder value effects of a decrease in foundation ownership are stronger in 
the latter group. Further robustness checks with a matched control sample of non-
foundation owned firms confirm our main results.
Our study contributes to the blockholder literature about the shareholder value 
effects of blockholder ownership (Morck et al. 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; 
Thomsen et  al. 2006). Prior research has not treated foundations as a separate 
and specific category of blockholders. We show that the shareholder value effects 
of foundation ownership have to be distinguished from the shareholder value 
effects of other forms of blockholder ownership. Our study also contributes to the 
small but growing literature on the performance of foundation-owned firms. Prior 
1 3
Foundation ownership and shareholder value: an event study 
studies have investigated the accounting performance of foundation-owned firms 
(Dzansi 2012; Herrmann and Franke 2002; Thomsen 1996; Thomsen and Rose 
2004). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first and so far only one that 
focuses on the equity market performance of foundation-owned firms using an 
event study method. As many foundation-owned firms have hybrid goals, we also 
contribute to research about the performance effects of hybrid organizations (Bat-
tilana and Lee 2014; Achleitner and Block 2018).
The rest of this study proceeds as follows: Sect. 2 defines and introduces founda-
tion-owned firms and gives a brief summary of prior research on the performance of 
foundation-owned firms. Section 3 develops hypotheses about the shareholder value 
effects of foundation ownership. Section 4 introduces our data and the event study 
method. Section 5 reports the results of our empirical analyses. Section 6 discusses 
our results and concludes.
2  Literature review
The literature review is comprised of three parts. The first part defines foundation-
owned firms as a particular group of firms and provides some background about 
their unique characteristics. The second part summarizes prior research about the 
(accounting) performance of foundation-owned firms. The third part summarizes 
event study results about the shareholder value effects of blockholder ownership.
2.1  Definition and characteristics of foundation‑owned firms
Foundation-owned firms are firms that are partly or fully owned by foundations 
(Herrmann and Franke 2002; Thomsen 2012). The foundation is typically created 
by a firm’s founder or founding family who transfer their equity stake into a foun-
dation. In many cases, the foundation is created to solve firm succession problems 
(Fleschutz 2009). The founder may not have an appropriate heir in his or her fam-
ily (Kronke 1988; Fleschutz 2009), may want to avoid or circumvent family-related 
succession conflicts (Davis and Harveston 2001), or does not want to sell the firm 
to outside investors, such as competitors or private equity firms (Klöckner 2009; 
Scholes et al. 2010).
Foundations are institutions without shareholders or owners. They can be sub-
divided into private and charitable foundations. Private foundations owning firms 
are typically family foundations. The main purposes of family foundations are to 
maintain the wealth of the founding family and to avoid family conflicts (Børsting 
et al. 2016; Davis and Harveston 1999, 2001). The firm distributes its dividends to 
the foundation, which it then distributes to the family. The family is typically rep-
resented on the foundation’s board, but it no longer has a direct equity stake in the 
firm. The latter makes it difficult for the family to sell the firm to outside inves-
tors. The firm remains independent and avoids problems related to family conflicts. 
The family has however to give up some influence on the firm’s management and 
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strategy, as the firm is now owned and controlled by the foundation and not by the 
respective family.
Instead of transferring the equity into a family foundation, the founder or fam-
ily may alternatively decide to transfer the equity into a charitable foundation. The 
foundation then uses the dividends it receives from the firm for charitable pur-
poses, as defined in the foundation charter. The final beneficiaries of the dividends 
have no control or voting rights to influence the decisions of the foundation or the 
foundation-owned firm, which is in stark contrast to other firm owners, who are 
typically individuals with residual claims and control rights (Thomsen 1999). The 
board members of charitable foundations are typically people with a professional 
background in the non-profit sector. These people might be incapable of effectively 
monitoring the firm’s management, as they may lack the entrepreneurial, industry, 
and management know-how needed for effective corporate governance (Franke and 
Draheim 2015). In such a situation, a lack of corporate control can occur, which 
provides opportunities for other stakeholders, such as the firm’s employees or man-
agement, to pursue their own interests at the expense of the firms’ development and 
profitability. Previous studies show that foundation-owned firms have more employ-
ees, pay higher wages, offer more secure jobs, have higher reputation, and show 
more responsible business behavior when compared to other firms of similar size 
(Franke and Draheim 2015; Børsting and Thomsen 2017). Surprisingly, however, 
previous studies also show that the accounting performance of foundation-owned 
firms is similar to other firms (Thomsen 1996, 1999; Herrmann and Franke 2002; 
Thomsen and Rose 2004). Classical agency theory predicting a strong underper-
formance of foundation-owned firms due to lack of control (leading to moral hazard 
and higher agency costs) seems less applicable to describe the phenomenon of foun-
dation-owned firms. The foundation charter is an important characteristic of founda-
tion-owned firms. The charter is influenced by the spirit and will of the founder of 
the foundation (and the firm) and is difficult to change after his or her death. In many 
cases, the foundation charter obliges the foundation to retain a majority of the firm’s 
shares (Thomsen and Hansmann 2013). For this reason, foundation-owned firms can 
face problems when trying to raise equity or engage in M&A activities. Conversely, 
the fact that the foundation charter is very difficult to change can be an effective pro-
tection against (hostile) takeovers (Thomsen and Rose 2004).1 This may lead to the 
adoption of a more long-term oriented strategy by foundation-owned firms versus 
other firms, which can be a benefit for shareholders and create shareholder value 
(Graves and Waddock 1990).
The special governance structure of foundation-owned firms together with 
the absence of any legal obligation for foundations to make the foundation char-
ter publicly accessible creates a lack of transparency. This lack of transparency and 
the resulting uncertainty for investors presents a unique challenge for foundation-
owned firms listed on the stock market. Equity investors might be afraid or unwill-
ing to invest in a firm with an uncommon and non-transparent governance and goal 
structure.
1 This argument does not apply when equity stake of the foundation is below 25%.
1 3
Foundation ownership and shareholder value: an event study 
2.2  Performance of foundation‑owned firms
Little is known about the shareholder value effects of foundation ownership in listed 
firms. Most prior research is about the accounting performance of foundation-owned 
firms. In the following, we give a brief overview of the literature on the performance 
of foundation-owned firms.
Thomsen (1996) is the first study that examines the performance of foundation-
owned firms. It compares foundation-owned firms to private firms with personal 
ownership and public firms with dispersed ownership. The study uses accounting 
data from the 300 largest companies in Denmark from 1982 to 1992 and finds no 
significant differences between foundation-owned firms, private firms, and pub-
lic firms regarding return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Thomsen 
(1999) finds that tax advantages and monitoring by minority investors and debt pro-
viders cannot explain this unexpected result. Performance increases if the family is 
a member of the foundation’s board, but the results are not significant. There is also 
a tendency that publicly listed foundation-owned firms have lower ROE than non-
listed foundation-owned firms. Herrmann and Franke (2002) compare foundation-
owned firms to publicly listed firms using German accounting data from 1990 to 
1992. They find that foundation-owned firms show a slightly higher accounting per-
formance than listed firms. Thomsen and Rose (2004) examine the stock-market val-
uation of foundation-owned firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in the 
period from 1996 to 1999. In a sample of 171 firms, 20 firms are majority controlled 
by a foundation. Their results show that listed foundation-owned firms do not dif-
fer from other listed firms regarding risk adjusted stock returns, accounting returns, 
and Tobin’s q. In another study, Dzansi (2012) uses Stockholm Stock Exchange data 
of 182 firms over the period from 1999 to 2005 and compares the performance of 
foundation-owned firms with other firms. The study finds no effect of foundation 
ownership on Tobin’s q. Hansmann and Thomsen (2013) take a different approach 
and examine the performance of different groups of Danish and Swedish founda-
tion-owned firms over the period from 2003 to 2009. The study shows that unlisted 
foundation-owned firms underperform compared to listed firms when matched by 
industry and firm size, while listed foundation-owned firms outperform in terms of 
accounting returns and firm value. Franke and Draheim (2015) use a sample of 164 
German firms to compare foundation-owned firms to family firms. Using accounting 
data from 2003 to 2012, the study shows that foundation-owned firms are larger than 
matched firms regarding employees, operating revenues, and total assets. Further, 
the study shows that foundation-owned firms pursue a more conservative financing 
policy, helping them to stabilize their long-term existence. The study also shows that 
foundation-owned firms perform slightly weaker than comparable matched firms.
2.3  Shareholder value effects of blockholder ownership
Blockholders are shareholders owning a substantial share of a company’s stock. The 
exact threshold of what is considered ‘substantial’ varies between countries and 
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their respective corporate governance systems. Two perspectives exist on the share-
holder value effects of blockholder ownership: The convergence-of-interest hypoth-
esis (Morck et al. 1988; De Miguel et al. 2004) suggests that blockholder ownership 
shall have a positive effect on shareholder value. In line with this argument founda-
tions as owners shall have both the incentive and the power to effectively monitor a 
firm’s management (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Zeckhauser and Pund 1990). The 
entrenchment hypothesis (Morck et al. 1988), however, suggests the opposite. Con-
centrated ownership may lead to an entrenchment of blockholders and managers, 
resulting in an expropriation of minority shareholders (Morck et al. 1988; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997).
There exists an established literature using event study methods to measure the 
shareholder value effects of blockholder ownership. Most of these studies find a pos-
itive effect (Holderness and Sheehan 1988; Lewellen et al. 1985; Agrawal and Man-
delker 1990; Barclay and Holderness 1990; Bethel et  al. 1998; Holderness 2003). 
Some studies focus on particular types of blockholders. Achleitner et al. (2011) and 
Renneboog et al. (2007), for example, investigated the shareholder value effects of 
private equity ownership in Germany and the UK and find positive effects. Simi-
lar results are obtained for hedge funds as firm owners (Bessler et  al. 2015; Brav 
et al. 2008). With regard to banks as blockholders, the findings are mixed. Boehmer 
(2000) reports that banks only have a positive effect on shareholder value if there 
exists a second blockholder in the firm. Regarding families as blockholders, Basu 
et al. (2009) and Chang et al. (2010) find that family ownership per se has a positive 
effect on shareholder value, which, however, reduces in situations where ownership 
and control are separated.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one focusing on the share-
holder value effects of foundation ownership using an event study method.
3  Hypotheses about shareholder value effects of foundation 
ownership
We develop two basic hypotheses about the shareholder value effects of foundation 
ownership. Hypothesis 1 concerns the abnormal returns following the announce-
ment by a foundation that it intends to increase its equity stake; hypothesis 2 refers 
to the abnormal returns following a foundation’s announcement that it intends to 
decrease its equity stake.
Foundations as firm owners are typically large shareholders (Dzansi 2012; Thomsen 
2016). Like other blockholders, such as families or private equity firms (Maury and 
Pajuste 2005), foundations should have a strong incentive to monitor the firm in an effi-
cient and effective way. They cannot easily sell their equity stake and should thus have 
a long-term investment horizon (Laverty 1996). These characteristics should reduce 
agency costs between ownership and management, thereby resulting in a positive effect 
on shareholder value. On the other hand, as discussed in the previous section, founda-
tions are not the residual claimants of their ownership stake (Thomsen 1999). Founda-
tions act on behalf of their founders, who are often no longer alive. Foundations do not 
use the received dividends for themselves, but rather distribute them to either charitable 
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projects or to families or individual persons. Cases like this, where a residual claimant 
is missing, reduce the monitoring incentives for foundations and can lead to situations 
in which a firms’ management or other stakeholders pursue their own interests, to the 
detriment of shareholders. In particular the stakeholder group of employees might ben-
efit from such a situation. Prior research shows that foundation-owned firms have more 
employees, pay higher wages, and typically offer more secure jobs than other firms of 
similar size (Franke and Draheim 2015; Børsting and Thomsen 2017).
Another argument concerns the inflexible nature of foundations as shareholders. As 
it is difficult for foundations to sell their equity stake, and because the foundation char-
ter typically forces them to be a majority or at least a blocking shareholder, it is difficult 
for foundation-owned companies to raise additional equity capital. This reduces growth 
possibilities for the firm and can have a negative effect on shareholder value (Agrawal 
and Knoeber 1996). From the firm’s perspective, it can be argued that the foundation’s 
inflexibility as shareholder provides an effective takeover defense, making the firm less 
likely to be a (hostile) takeover target. This situation, however, makes the stock less 
appealing to some investors and can lead to stock price discounts (Bebchuk et al. 2009). 
In other words: foundation-owned firms have a lower probability of being acquired and 
equity markets expect lower acquisition premiums.
Finally, foundations as firm owners are mostly unknown to equity markets, thus 
creating uncertainty. The institution of foundation ownership is uncommon in most 
countries and uncommon to most investors. This uncertainty further increases because 
foundations typically have a very broad and heterogeneous set of goals. Prior research 
shows that equity markets do not like uncertainty and put a discount on stocks associ-
ated with uncertainty (Baltussen et al. 2014).
Following this collection of arguments, we posit two hypotheses. The first hypoth-
esis concerns the shareholder value effects (measured as abnormal returns) of an 
announcement by a foundation to increase its equity stake. We posit:
H1  The announcement by a foundation to increase its equity stake leads to nega-
tive abnormal returns.
The second hypothesis concerns the shareholder value effects (measured as abnor-
mal returns) of an announcement by a foundation to decrease its equity stake. In line 
with the arguments above, we posit:
H2  The announcement by a foundation to decrease its equity stake leads to posi-
tive abnormal returns.
4  Event study method
We use the event study method to investigate how equity markets evaluate listed 
foundation-owned firms. In particular, we aim to identify the shareholder value 
effects of changes in equity stakes held by foundations in their respective firms, 
if any such effects exist. In comparison to regression analysis using Tobin’s q as 
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dependent variable, the event study approach allows us to measure the direct share-
holder value effects attributed to the transaction announcements, instead of relying 
on a performance proxy based either on quarterly or (semi-) yearly data determined 
by a variety of other factors.
Following Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), the abnormal returns (ARi,t) used to 
capture the effects of transaction announcements are calculated by applying the mar-
ket model. Hence, the expected returns of the investigated securities 
(
E
[
Ri,t
])
 , which 
constitute the hypothetical returns in the absence of the event, are approximated 
by using a market portfolio, in our case, the S&P Europe 350, as a comprehensive 
European stock market index. Assuming the market efficiency proposed by Fama 
(1970), we calculate the shareholder value effects of an intended change in a founda-
tion’s equity stake for a firm i on day t by subtracting the expected return from the 
actual (realized) return of the corresponding security 
(
Ri,t
)
:
We use an estimation window of 180 days (from t = − 200 till t = − 21) to obtain the 
OLS parameters ?̂?i and 𝛽i by conducting regressions of the firm’s actual returns on 
the market portfolio returns (RM,t ) within this pre-event period. We define the first 
date on which the transaction becomes known as our event day (t = 0). Since we 
are interested in the average shareholder value effect of the announcements for our 
entire sample, the average abnormal return (AARt) is calculated for each day t of the 
time period surrounding the actual announcement (from t = − 20 till t = 20):
We distinguish between two types of announcements, namely, between increases and 
decreases in equity stakes held by foundations. Consequently, N represents the total 
number of announcements that refer to the aforementioned increases or decreases in 
foundation ownership.
In the next step, we calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
within the event window (from T1 till T2 ) in order to obtain the full average share-
holder value effect for the group of foundation-owned firms:
To deal with the event date uncertainty issues discussed by e.g. MacKinlay (1997), 
we apply several event windows around the announcement day.
The statistical significance of the obtained results is evaluated by conducting 
the standardized cross-sectional test of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (BMP) 
(1)ARi,t = Ri,t − E
[
Ri,t
]
(2)E
[
Ri,t
]
= ?̂?i + 𝛽iRM,t
(3)AARt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARi,t
(4)CAAR[T1,T2] =
T2∑
t=T1
AARt
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(1991). This parametric test statistic uses the standard deviation obtained from 
the estimation window (adjusted for the forecasting error) to standardize the 
residuals, which improves the test’s efficiency and power:
where ?̂?2
ARi
 is the individual variance of abnormal returns derived from the estima-
tion window, whose length is constituted by L.
Furthermore, in contrast to the simple t test presented by Brown and Warner 
(1980), the BMP statistic does not assume the event-induced variance to be insig-
nificant and, thus, it allows for respective variance changes, which may be critical 
for our application. Consequently, we calculate the BMP test as follows:
where the denominator is the contemporaneous standard error and d is the number 
of parameter estimates. In order to evaluate the null hypothesis, which states that the 
CAAR equals zero, the test statistic for cumulated average residuals is conducted 
accordingly.
For robustness purposes, we also use a non-parametric test proposed by Cowan 
(1992). This test (also known as the Generalized Sign (GS) test) evaluates the 
null hypothesis that the ratio of positive cumulative abnormal returns within the 
event window ( p+
0
 ) does not systematically deviate from such a ratio obtained 
from the estimation period ( p+
EST
 ). Taking into account a possible asymmetric 
distribution of excess returns, the statistic is defined as:
The results of the BMP as well as GS test will be simultaneously reported in the 
next section.
(5)SARi,t =
ARi,t
Si,t
(6)Si,t =
�����?̂?2
ARi
�
1 +
1
L
+
�
RM,t − R̄M
�2
∑t=−21
t=−200
�
RM,t − R̄M
�2
�
,
(7)TBMP =
1
N
∑N
i=1
SARi,t�
1
N(N−d)
∑N
i=1
�
SARi,t −
1
N
∑N
j=1
SARj,t
�2 ,
(8)TGS =
p+
0
− p+
EST√
p+
EST
(
1 − p+
EST
)
∕N
 A.-K. Achleitner et al.
1 3
5  Sample and results of the event study analysis
5.1  Sample of listed foundation‑owned firms and sample of events
The focus of our study is on the three German speaking countries Germany, Aus-
tria, and Switzerland. We started with a list of German foundation-owned firms 
generated from Fleschutz (2009) and Besecke (2015). Using this list, we checked 
the ownership structure of those firms listed in the DAX, MDAX, SDAX and 
TecDAX to identify all foundation-owned firms listed on the German stock mar-
ket. We cross-checked and verified this sample of listed foundation-owned firms 
with data from the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BAFIN). To include 
listed foundation-owned firms from Austria and Switzerland in our sample, we 
examined the ownership structure of all companies listed on the Austrian (ATX, 
IATX) and Swiss (SMI, SPI, SLI) share indexes. For the identified firms, we then 
used the LexisNexis database and other data sources to identify relevant events 
referring to announcements about intended changes in foundation ownership.
Our events of interest are announcements by foundations to either increase or 
decrease their equity stakes in foundation-owned firms. As an example of such an 
event where the foundation announces its intention to increase its equity stake, 
consider the announcement by the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Stif-
tung (which owns Thyssenkrupp) to increase its equity stake from 20.6 to 25% 
(2007). Another example is the announcement of the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen 
und Halbach Stiftung not to participate in the firm’s equity capital increase, which 
resulted in the foundation losing its blocking minority (2013).
Following this procedure, we were able to produce an initial sample of 83 
events. These events occurred between 1993 and 2016. Because the necessary 
price data was missing for two of the aforementioned events, we had to drop those 
from our sample. Our final estimation sample thus covers 81 announcements 
from 29 listed foundation-owned firms. Of the 81 events, 41 events are related to 
announcements by foundations of increases in their equity stakes and 40 events 
refer to announcements about decreases in equity stakes. Table 8 in the Appendix 
shows the names of the firms in our sample and the corresponding events. We 
also denote events related to common and to preferred stock (4 events). The latter 
group is excluded in our comparison of shareholder value effects for foundations 
with above versus below 25% of equity. We also had to exclude one event where 
no information on the size of the equity stake was available. This yields a sam-
ple of 41 events where foundation-ownership is above 25% and 35 events where 
foundation-ownership is below 25%.
To check the robustness of our results and to show that our results are not 
driven by blockholder ownership per se, we created a control sample with 
announcements about changes in equity stakes related to other blockholders of 
the foundation-owned firms investigated in our study. Other blockholders refer to 
other large shareholders which are not foundations. The final control sample cov-
ers 75 announcements, out of which 40 events refer to announcements by other 
blockholders to increase their equity stakes and 35 events relate to announcements 
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about equity stake decreases. We refer to blockholders as all major sharehold-
ers that are explicitly listed as large shareholders in the company’s annual report. 
The names of the firms and the respective events are provided in Table 9 in the 
“Appendix”. Table  1 shows the composition of both the main and the control 
sample.
5.2  Event study results for foundations as blockholders
Table 2 reports the event study results. The second column provides the (C)AARs 
for six different event windows; columns 3 and 4 report the results of the BMP and 
GS tests, respectively. 
The results show that no meaningful shareholder value effects can be observed 
when a foundation announces an increase in its equity stake. The stock price 
decreases by only 0.02% on the announcement day and by 0.12% within the 7-day 
event window around the announcement. Using other event windows, such as the 
3-day event window, we find weak positive stock price reactions. These announce-
ment effects are, however, statistically insignificant, as the results of the BMP and 
Table 1  Sample description
Sample No. of events (all 
announcements)
No. of events (announcements 
of equity stake increases)
No. of events (announce-
ments of equity stake 
decreases)
Foundations 81 41 40
Other blockholders 75 40 35
Table 2  Event study results of 
main sample (foundations as 
shareholders)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Event window CAAR (in %) BMP test  
(p values)
GS test  
(p values)
Announcements of equity stake increases (no. of events: 41)
 (− 3…3) − 0.12 0.7163 0.3885
 (− 2…2) 0.66 0.4041 0.1367
 (− 1…1) 0.15 0.7473 0.8131
 (0…0) − 0.02 0.9021 0.5827
 (0…1) 0.36 0.3541 0.5827
 (0…3) 0.67 0.1506 0.3885
Announcements of equity stake decreases (no. of events: 40)
 (− 3…3) 1.77 0.0478** 0.5550
 (− 2…2) 2.02 0.0525* 0.0299**
 (− 1…1) 0.82 0.3974 0.0299**
 (0…0) 0.27 0.2123 0.1238
 (0…1) 0.81 0.0300** 0.0636*
 (0…3) 2.20 0.0018*** 0.0299**
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GS tests show. On the other hand, the announcement by a foundation to decrease 
its equity stake has a statistically and economically significant effect. We find that 
such an announcement by a foundation leads to a CAAR of 2.20% within the event 
window which starts on the event day and ends three days after the announcement 
(BMP test is significant at 1% level; GS test is significant at 5% level). This find-
ing is further supported by the positive CAAR for the 7-day event window (1.77%; 
BMP test is significant at 5% level), the 5-day event window (2.02%; BMP test is 
significant at 10% level; GS test is significant at 5% level), the 3-day event win-
dow (0.82%; GS test is significant at 5% level), and the 2-day event window (0.81%; 
BMP test is significant at 5% level; GS test is significant at 10% level), respectively.2
5.3  Event study results for non‑foundation blockholders in foundation‑owned 
firms
To assess whether the ascertained announcement effects can be attributed to special 
characteristics of foundations as shareholders, we additionally analyze shareholder 
value effects related to announcements of ownership changes by other blockhold-
ers. For this purpose, we searched in our sample of foundation-owned firms for 
announcements by non-foundation blockholders to increase or decrease their equity 
stakes. As with the other event study analyses reported above, we calculate the (C)
AARs for six different event windows.
Table 3  Event study results 
of control sample (non-
foundation blockholders as 
shareholders)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Event window CAAR (in %) BMP test  
(p values)
GS test  
(p values)
Announcements of equity stake increases (no. of events: 40)
 (− 3…3) 1.46 0.1942 0.8288
 (− 2…2) 0.64 0.7456 0.2940
 (− 1…1) 0.34 0.6934 0.2438
 (0…0) 0.44 0.0660* 0.5943
 (0…1) 1.06 0.0362** 0.0721*
 (0…3) 1.14 0.0499** 0.2438
Announcements of equity stake decreases (no. of events: 35)
 (− 3…3) − 0.58 0.3969 0.6181
 (− 2…2) − 0.28 0.7008 0.3920
 (− 1…1) − 0.33 0.7942 0.6049
 (0…0) − 0.34 0.9991 0.8729
 (0…1) − 0.55 0.8513 0.3920
 (0…3) − 0.82 0.3714 0.2397
2 We receive qualitatively very similar results after the exclusion of 4 events (see “Appendix” for the 
exact events) attributed to preferred shares. The results can be obtained from the second author.
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Table 3 shows the results of this analysis. First of all, we find that equity stake 
increases announced by a non-foundation shareholder are associated with persistent 
positive abnormal returns. The stock price increases by 0.44% on the announcement 
day (BMP test is significant at 10% level), by 1.06% within the 2-day event window 
(BMP test is significant at 5% level; GS test is significant at 10% level), and even 
by 1.14% within the event window starting on the event day and ending three days 
after the announcement (BMP test is significant at 5% level). For other event win-
dows, the stock price reactions are also positive, but statistically insignificant. When 
a non-foundation blockholder in a foundation-owned firm announces that he or she 
will decrease his or her equity stake, negative CAARs can be observed in contrast 
to positive stock price reactions to such announcements made by foundations as 
blockholders. The negative stock price effects ascertained for other blockholders 
are, however, statistically insignificant for all event windows used in our study. In 
sum, it seems that equity markets attribute different characteristics to foundations as 
blockholders in comparison to other blockholders and, as a result, the announcement 
returns associated with changes in foundation ownership differ from those identified 
for non-foundation blockholders active in foundation-owned firms.
Table 4  Difference-in-means test results
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Event window CAAR (in %) foundations 
(no. of events: 41)
CAAR (in %) non-foundation 
blockholders (no. of events: 40)
Difference in CAAR 
(one-sided test)
Announcements of equity stake increases
 (− 3…3) − 0.12 1.46 − 1.58
 (− 2…2) 0.66 0.64 0.02
 (− 1…1) 0.15 0.34 − 0.19
 (0…0) − 0.02 0.44 − 0.46
 (0…1) 0.36 1.06 − 0.70
 (0…3) 0.67 1.14 − 0.47
Event window CAAR (in %) foundations 
(no. of events: 40)
CAAR (in %) non-foundation  
blockholders (no. of events: 35)
Difference in CAAR 
(one-sided test)
Announcements of equity stake decreases
 (− 3…3) 1.77 − 0.58 2.35**
 (− 2…2) 2.02 − 0.28 2.30**
 (− 1…1) 0.82 − 0.33 1.15
 (0…0) 0.27 − 0.34 0.61
 (0…1) 0.81 − 0.55 1.36*
 (0…3) 2.20 − 0.82 3.02***
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5.4  Difference‑in‑means test results
Finally, we apply difference-in-means tests to investigate whether the divergences in 
stock price reactions ascertained for announcements by foundations and non-foun-
dation blockholders to increase or decrease their equity stakes are statistically signifi-
cant. Table 4 reports the results of this analysis. The second column summarizes the 
(C)AARs for announcements by foundations and the third column summarizes the (C)
AARs for announcements by non-foundation blockholders; column 4 reports the differ-
ences between the (C)AARs for the two groups and indicates their statistical significance 
based on a one-sided test. With regard to announcements of increases in equity stakes, 
the mainly negative differences in the stock price effects, which indicate less positive 
or even negative announcement returns for foundations compared to other blockholders, 
are all insignificant. On the other hand, the persistently positive differences between the 
stock price reactions attributed to announcements of equity stake decreases by founda-
tions compared to other blockholders are significant for several event windows investi-
gated in our study. This particularly applies to the differences ascertained for the 7-day 
event window (2.35%; t test is significant at 5% level), the 5-day event window (2.30%; 
t-test is significant at 5% level), the 4-day event window (3.02%; t-test is significant at 
1% level), and the 2-day event window (1.36%; t-test is significant at 10% level). These 
results corroborate our finding that foundations are a special type of blockholder.
5.5  Post‑hoc analysis and robustness checks
In a post hoc analysis, we distinguish between foundation-owned firms where a 
foundation owns an equity stake above 25% and those firms where a foundation 
owns less than 25% of equity. The 25% threshold refers to the situation before the 
announcement and the transaction. This analysis is applied to get a more detailed 
overview of our main results. We chose 25% as a threshold because an equity stake 
of more than 25% is essential for several important decisions taken at the annual 
shareholders’ meetings of German stock companies, such as bylaw changes and 
capital increases (§§179 Abs. 2, 182 Abs. 1 AktG). Table 5 reports the results attrib-
uted to the respective sample split. First of all, we find that our previous results are 
robust and that an announcement by a foundation to decrease its equity stake has a 
significantly positive effect on shareholder value, both for foundation-owned firms 
in which a foundation holds more than 25% of firm’s shares and for those in which 
it holds less than 25%. For an announcement of a foundation to increase its owner-
ship share, we do not find statistically significant effects in either group. The sample 
split also shows that the positive announcement effects of equity stake decreases are 
particularly strong when a foundation holds less than 25% of equity.
In a next step, we apply the 25% threshold and run a difference-in-means test 
comparing the shareholder value effects of foundations with those of non-foundation 
blockholders. We focus our analysis on announcements of equity stake decreases, as 
no meaningful shareholder value effects for announcements of equity stake increases 
by foundations were found (Table 2). Table 6 reports the results of this analysis. In 
sum, significant differences can be observed between foundations and non-foundation 
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blockholders irrespective of whether blockholder ownership is above or below 25%, 
thus supporting our previous findings. However, the result of the difference-in-means 
test for the blockholders with above 25% of equity should not be overinterpreted, as 
there are only three events referring to the group of non-foundation blockholders.
As another robustness check, we created a matched control sample of non-foun-
dation firms with blockholder ownership of less than 25% of equity. The matched 
firms were selected according to the following criteria: industry, firm size (total 
assets), equity stake, and leverage. For those firms, we calculated the shareholder 
value effects following the announcement of a decrease in blockholder ownership. 
Using a difference-in-means test, we find significant differences in the CAARs 
between the two samples (Table 7) supporting our main result that equity markets 
are skeptical about foundations as shareholders.
6  Discussion and conclusion
6.1  Summary of main results and contributions to the literature
Based on the unique and special characteristics of foundations as shareholders, we 
hypothesized a negative effect of foundation ownership on shareholder value. Our 
Table 5  Event study results of sample split (main sample)
Preferred shares are excluded
BMP test *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
GS test +++ p < 0.01, ++ p < 0.05, + p < 0.1
Event window CAAR (in %) 
under 25% of ownership
(no. of events: 23)
CAAR (in %) 
over 25% of ownership
(no. of events: 17)
Announcements of equity stake increases
 (− 3…3) − 0.56 − 0.05
 (− 2…2) − 0.10 1.04
 (− 1…1) − 1.37 1.40
 (0…0) − 0.12 − 0.05
 (0…1) − 0.07 0.37
 (0…3) 0.97 0.03
Event window CAAR (in %) 
under 25% of ownership
(no. of events: 12)
CAAR (in %) 
over 25% of ownership
(no. of events: 24)
Announcements of equity stake decreases
 (− 3…3) 5.07** − 0.20
 (− 2…2) 5.51***(+) 0.04
 (− 1…1) 1.38 0.31
 (0…0) − 0.63 0.68**
 (0…1) − 0.30 1.28***(+)
 (0…3) 3.37**(+) 1.45*
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empirical evidence support this hypothesis and indicates that equity markets show 
a positive reaction when a foundation announces that it will decrease its equity 
stake. This positive reaction is particularly strong when a foundation holds an equity 
stake of less than 25%. Our results are strengthened by the fact that announcements 
about changes in the shareholdings of other blockholders active in our sample firms 
deliver opposite results. Equity markets are thus skeptical about foundations as 
Table 6  Difference-in-means test results of sample split
Preferred shares are excluded
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Over 25%
Event window
CAAR (in %) foundations 
(no. of events: 24)
CAAR (in %) non-foundation 
blockholders (no. of events: 3)
Difference in CAAR 
(one-sided test)
Announcements of equity stake decreases
 (− 3…3) − 0.20 − 1.20 1.00
 (− 2…2) 0.04 − 0.24 0.28
 (− 1…1) 0.31 − 1.07 1.38
 (0…0) 0.68 − 2.53 3.21***
 (0…1) 1.28 − 4.66 5.95***
 (0…3) 1.45 − 5.42 6.87***
Under 25%
Event window
CAAR (in %) foundations 
(no. of events: 12)
CAAR (in %) non-foundation 
blockholders (no. of events: 11)
Difference in CAAR 
(one-sided test)
Announcements of equity stake decreases
 (− 3…3) 5.07 − 1.94 7.01**
 (− 2…2) 5.51 − 1.53 7.04**
 (− 1…1) 1.38 − 1.03 2.41
 (0…0) − 0.63 − 0.35 − 0.28
 (0…1) − 0.30 − 0.31 0.01
 (0…3) 3.37 − 0.83 4.20**
Table 7  Difference-in-means test results for announcements of blockholders holding less than 25% to 
decrease their equity stakes
Preferred shares are excluded
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Under 25%
Event window
CAAR (in %) foundations 
(no. of events: 12)
CAAR (in %) matched 
firms (no. of events: 12)
Difference in CAAR 
(one-sided test)
Announcements of 
equity stake decreases
 (− 3…3) 5.07 − 1.44 6.51***
 (− 2…2) 5.51 − 0.62 6.13**
 (− 1…1) 1.38 − 0.40 1.78
 (0…0) − 0.63 0.19 − 0.82
 (0…1) − 0.30 − 0.85 0.55
 (0…3) 3.37 − 2.34 5.71***
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blockholders and “celebrate” the news that they intend to reduce or completely sell 
their equity stakes. This skepticism by equity markets can be explained in different 
ways. Equity markets might be skeptical regarding foundations’ monitoring capa-
bilities, the goal divergences that exist between foundations and firms, the hybrid 
nature of the foundations’ goals (Achleitner and Block 2018), or the legal restric-
tions that come with this particular form of firm ownership (e.g., restrictions due to 
the foundation’s charter). Due to the foundation’s strong long-term focus and empha-
sis of non-financial goals, there could also be severe conflicts of interest between the 
foundation and other (large) shareholders leading to a hitherto not analyzed form 
of principal-principal conflict. This conflict is particularly likely to occur when a 
potentially stakeholder- and employee-friendly charitable foundation meets with 
primarily financially motivated activist investors or hedge funds. The situation at 
Thyssen-Krupp, one of Germany’s largest listed foundation-owned firms, is a recent 
example of such a principal-principal conflict. Our study is not able to tease apart 
these different explanations; hence, further research using larger samples and differ-
ent research designs is needed (see future research below).
With these results, our study contributes to research about foundations as firm 
owners (e.g., Draheim 2016; Eulerich 2015; Fleschutz 2009; Herrmann 1996). 
We extend the literature on the performance implications of foundation ownership 
(e.g., Dzansi 2012; Herrmann and Franke 2002; Thomsen 1996; Thomsen and Rose 
2004). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first and only one that focuses 
on the equity market performance of foundation-owned firms using an event study 
method. Our study also adds to the broader literature about the performance con-
sequences of blockholder ownership. The blockholder literature has focused on the 
performance and shareholder value effects of ownership by families (see Wagner 
et al. 2015 for a meta-analysis), private equity firms (e.g., Achleitner et al. 2011), 
banks (e.g., Lin et al. 2009), institutional investors (e.g., Mizuno 2010), and venture 
capital firms (e.g., Dai 2007). Our results show that foundations constitute a special 
type of blockholder, which has so far been overlooked. Although foundation own-
ership is currently still a niche phenomenon it already concerns some of the larg-
est firms in German speaking and Scandinavian countries (e.g., Bosch, Zeiss, Ikea, 
and A. P. Møller-Mærsk). Furthermore, due to the fact that foundation-owned firms 
are frequently hold by charitable foundations, we also contribute to research about 
the performance effects of hybrid organizing. In organizational research, there is an 
ongoing discussion about how organizations can combine multiple identities, goals, 
and organizational cultures in one organization (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Bat-
tilana and Lee 2014; Mair et al. 2015). Our research shows that equity markets are 
skeptical about foundation-owned firms, which represent a special type of hybrid 
organization (Achleitner and Block 2018).
6.2  Implications for practice
Although our sample is relatively small and the phenomenon of foundation owner-
ship is not common outside Western and Northern Europe, we formulate some ten-
tative ideas for practical implications relating to foundations and foundation-owned 
firms. Based on our findings that equity markets are skeptical about foundations 
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as shareholders, we suggest that foundations and foundation-owned firms need to 
explain the benefits of foundation ownership in a more effective way, such as by 
highlighting the long-term orientation afforded to the firm via foundation owner-
ship. They may also need to be more transparent about their unique and special 
corporate governance structure. For many (foreign) shareholders, foundations are a 
“black box”, which creates uncertainty about their motives and goals. Finally, our 
results combined with prior research about the accounting performance of founda-
tion-owned firms (Thomsen 1996, 1999; Herrmann and Franke 2002; Thomsen and 
Rose 2004) imply that the stock market discount attached to some types of founda-
tion-owned firms might not be justified. In fact, foundation-owned firms may actu-
ally be undervalued on the stock market, thereby constituting an attractive (long-
term) investment.
6.3  Limitations and avenues for further research
Our event study suffers from two main limitations. First, we have a relatively small 
number of events. This is because the number of listed foundation-owned firms is 
still relatively small. We were also not able to find announcements of foundation 
equity stake changes for each listed foundation-owned firm and the public announce-
ments of foundations to change their ownership stakes often do not contain detailed 
information on the respective percentage changes. The phenomenon of listed foun-
dation-owned firms is still relatively small and young, although we believe this will 
change in the future as the interest in foundations as firm owners is growing steadily. 
Second, our results are not transferable to other countries, as the legal construct of 
foundation-owned firms only exists in a few, mostly European countries. Moreover, 
there are important differences between countries in the legal character of founda-
tions. In the U.S., for example, private foundations or trusts are not allowed to own 
more than 20 percent of a firm’s shares (Fleishman 2003).
Our study opens several avenues of further research. First, it would be interesting 
to focus on sub-samples of foundation-owned firms and compare for example the 
shareholder value effects of private versus charitable foundations. Such a compari-
son was not possible in our study due to the low number of events in either group. It 
could be argued that charitable foundations face greater difficulties monitoring the 
firm’s management than private foundations. The reason is that charitable founda-
tions typically employ and are managed by individuals with a professional back-
ground in the social or charitable sector, and therefore may not have the expertise to 
effectively monitor the firm’s management. Private (family) foundations, in turn, are 
typically managed and governed by descendants of the firms’ founder. Moreover, it 
can be argued that the two groups of foundations also differ in the degree to which 
they are known to capital markets. Family foundations are a common tool used 
to manage family wealth and are also known to US investors. Moreover, they are 
often regarded as a special type of family ownership (Villalonga and Amit 2008). 
By contrast, charitable foundations and their goals as firm owners are less known 
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to equity markets outside of German speaking countries and Scandinavia. This cre-
ates uncertainty for many equity investors and can lead to a decrease in shareholder 
value. To summarize, we would expect listed firms owned by private foundations 
to be similar to listed family firms, and to be very different from foundation-owned 
firms owned by charitable foundations. Future research could also try to investigate 
why we could not observe in our data that an increase in the stake of the foundation 
has a negative effect on stock prices. Another direction of future research concerns 
the (causal) mechanism that underlies our results. Future research could try to find 
out why equity markets are skeptical of foundation equity ownership. For instance, 
is this due to foundations’ monitoring problems, goal divergences between founda-
tions and firms, foundations being hybrid organizations with multiple goals, or legal 
restrictions that come with this particular form of firm ownership. Future research 
can tackle these questions by utilizing larger samples and different research designs. 
Another avenue of further research would be to focus on different types of events, 
such as announcements about board changes in foundations. It would also be inter-
esting to investigate our research question in a multi-country setting. Aside from 
German speaking countries, foundation-owned firms are also common in Scandina-
via, and the BeNeLux-countries. It would be interesting to compare the shareholder 
value effects of foundations across countries. We would expect differences in those 
effects, as the legal character of foundations differs across countries. Furthermore, 
such an analysis based on a larger number of events resulting from more countries 
could allow further distinguishing between shareholder value effects of meaning-
ful and marginal changes in foundation ownership. Moreover, the Nordic country 
system of corporate governance differs from the German system of corporate gov-
ernance, which could affect how equity markets view foundations as firm owners. 
Finally, one could focus on the effects of foundation ownership on debt markets. As 
foundations are stable and long-term oriented firm owners, this could have positive 
implications for foundation-owned firms seeking funding via corporate bonds.
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Table 8  List of announcements of equity stake changes by foundations in foundation-owned firms
ISIN Firm Foundation type Date Event * Stake change
DE0006275001 Arcandor Charitable 06. 11. 1993 1 > 20%
DE0007686826 Gold-Zack Charitable 19. 01. 1996 0 > 50%
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 06. 05. 1998 0 n.a.
DE0008051004 Wüstenrot Charitable 05. 11. 1998 1 > 40%
DE0007164600 SAP Charitable 14. 12. 1998 1 n.a.
DE0006275001 Arcandor Charitable 03. 03. 1999 0 > 20%
DE0005775001 Fränkisches Überlandwerk Charitable 13. 01. 2000 0 n.a.
DE0008051004 Wüstenrot Charitable 11. 12. 2001 1 > 10%
DE0005550636 Drägerwerk** Private 19. 01. 2003 1 < 5%
DE0005313704 Zeiss Charitable 28. 06. 2003 0 n.a.
DE0006081003 Holsten Charitable 17. 07. 2003 0 < 5%
DE0005313704 Zeiss Charitable 11. 12. 2003 0 < 5%
DE0006081003 Holsten Charitable 28. 01. 2004 0 > 10%
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 14. 02. 2004 1 < 5%
DE0006081003 Holsten Charitable 12. 12. 2003 1 n.a.
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 23. 05. 2005 1 < 5%
AT0000834007 Wolford Private 13. 09. 2005 1 n.a.
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 14. 10. 2005 1 < 5%
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 29. 11. 2005 1 < 5%
DE0007572406 Utimaco Safeware Charitable 15. 12. 2005 0 n.a.
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 29. 12. 2006 1 > 5%
AT0000818802 DO & CO Private 29. 12. 2006 1 > 50%
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 16. 01. 2007 0 < 5%
DE0005550636 Drägerwerk** Private 20. 01. 2007 0 n.a.
DE0008063306 IKB Charitable 09. 03. 2007 1 < 5%
AT0000818802 DO & CO Private 26. 03. 2007 0 < 5%
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 12. 06. 2007 0 n.a.
DE0007239402 Simona Charitable 23. 06. 2007 1 > 10%
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 03. 07. 2007 1 n.a.
DE0008063306 IKB Charitable 25. 09. 2007 0 n.a.
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 06. 12. 2007 1 < 5%
DE0005403901 CEWE Private 21. 01. 2008 1 n.a.
DE0008063306 IKB Charitable 11. 02. 2008 0 < 5%
DE0005313704 Zeiss Charitable 11. 09. 2008 0 < 5%
AT0000937503 Voestalpine Private 26. 02. 2009 1 < 5%
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 23. 04. 2009 0 n.a.
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 01. 05. 2009 1 > 10%
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 18. 08. 2009 0 n.a.
AT0000652011 Erste Private 30. 10. 2009 0 > 5%
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 26. 03. 2010 0 n.a.
DE0007074007 KWS Saat Charitable 01. 05. 2010 1 > 10%
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 12. 05. 2010 1 < 5%
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* 1 = equity stake increase, 0 = equity stake decrease; n.a. = not available
** preferred stock
Table 8  (continued)
ISIN Firm Foundation type Date Event * Stake change
DE0006336100 Kuehlhaus Zentrum Charitable 26. 05. 2010 0 > 50%
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 10. 06. 2010 0 > 20%
DE0007239402 Simona Charitable 11. 06. 2010 1 n.a.
AT0000818802 DO & CO Private 06. 07. 2010 0 < 5%
AT0000834007 Wolford Private 08. 07. 2010 0 n.a.
DE0005550636 Drägerwerk** Private 15. 07. 2010 0 < 5%
AT0000818802 DO & CO Private 27. 11. 2010 0 > 10%
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 31. 01. 2011 1 < 5%
AT0000969985 AT & S Private 28. 09. 2011 1 n.a.
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 06. 12. 2011 1 < 5%
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 11. 05. 2012 0 < 5%
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 03. 07. 2012 1 n.a.
DE0008051004 Wüstenrot Charitable 25. 10. 2012 1 > 10%
AT0000937503 Voestalpine Private 13. 12. 2012 1 n.a.
DE0005772206 Fielmann Charitable 16. 12. 2012 1 n.a.
DE0007257503 Metro Charitable 18. 02. 2013 1 < 5%
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 22. 04. 2013 1 < 5%
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 15. 06. 2013 1 n.a.
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 03. 07. 2013 0 < 5%
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 05. 07. 2013 1 < 5%
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 15. 08. 2013 1 n.a.
DE0005550636 Drägerwerk** Private 14. 11. 2013 0 n.a.
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 03. 12. 2013 0 n.a.
AT0000652011 Erste Group Private 05. 12. 2013 0 < 5%
DE000EVNK013 Evonik Private 14. 12. 2013 0 < 5%
AT0TEAKHOLZ8 Teak Holz Private 29. 01. 2014 0 > 10%
DE000EVNK013 Evonik Private 21. 02. 2014 0 n.a.
DE0005403901 CEWE Private 09. 04. 2014 1 < 5%
DE0005313704 Zeiss Charitable 19. 05. 2014 0 n.a.
DE000EVNK013 Evonik Private 12. 02. 2015 0 n.a.
AT0000937503 Voestalpine Private 09. 03. 2015 1 n.a.
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 16. 03. 2015 1 n.a.
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 13. 05. 2015 1 < 5%
DE000EVNK013 Evonik Private 21. 07. 2015 0 < 5%
AT0000652011 Erste Private 14. 10. 2015 0 < 5%
DE0008051004 Wüstenrot Charitable 13. 11. 2015 1 n.a.
AT0000818802 DO & CO Private 01. 12. 2015 0 > 5%
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 14. 04. 2016 0 > 5%
CH0360826991 Comet Private 04. 05. 2016 1 < 10%
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Table 9  List of announcements of equity stake changes by non-foundation blockholders in foundation-
owned firms
ISIN Firm Foundation type Date Event * Stake change
DE0006275001 Arcandor Charitable 28. 11. 1997 0 > 10%
DE0006275001 Arcandor Chartiable 03. 03. 1998 1 n.a.
DE0006275001 Arcandor Charitable 28. 07. 1998 0 n.a.
DE0006275001 Arcandor Charitable 29. 07. 1999 0 n.a.
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 25. 08. 2000 1 > 5%
DE0008051004 Wüstenrot Charitable 09. 04. 2001 1 > 20%
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 17. 01. 2002 1 < 5%
DE0006275001 Arcandor Charitable 03. 01. 2003 1 n.a.
DE0007074007 KWS Saat Charitable 15. 07. 2004 0 n.a.
DE0007074007 KWS Saat Charitable 01. 12. 2004 0 n.a.
DE0005785604 Fresenius Charitable 15. 10. 2005 1 n.a.
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 22. 11. 2005 0 < 5%
DE0005403901 CEWE Private 10. 02. 2006 0 < 5%
DE0007164600 SAP Charitable 09. 03. 2006 0 n.a.
DE0005403901 CEWE Private 01. 06. 2006 1 < 5%
DE0005403901 CEWE Private 18. 07. 2006 1 < 5%
DE0005403901 CEWE Private 01. 01. 2007 1 n.a.
DE0005403901 CEWE Private 09. 02. 2007 1 n.a.
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 17. 04. 2007 1 > 5%
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 19. 06. 2007 1 > 10%
DE0008063306 IKB Charitable 26. 06. 2007 1 n.a.
DE0005403901 CEWE Private 14. 09. 2007 0 n.a.
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 02. 10. 2007 1 n.a.
DE0007572406 Utimaco Safeware Charitable 16. 10. 2007 0 n.a.
DE0005403901 CEWE Private 13. 11. 2007 0 < 5%
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 05. 12. 2007 1 n.a.
DE0005772206 Fielmann Charitable 10. 12. 2007 1 n.a.
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 05. 02. 2008 0 n.a.
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 28. 03. 2008 0 n.a.
DE0008063306 IKB Charitable 09. 04. 2008 0 n.a.
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 21. 07. 2008 1 n.a.
DE0008063306 IKB Charitable 20. 08. 2008 1 > 40%
DE0008063306 IKB Charitable 17. 09. 2008 0 > 50%
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 29. 10. 2008 1 > 5%
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 04. 05. 2009 1 n.a.
DE0008051004 Wüstenrot Charitable 18. 07. 2009 0 < 5%
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 18. 08. 2009 1 n.a.
AT0000652011 Erste Private 17. 11. 2009 1 n.a.
DE0006336100 Kuehlhaus Zentrum Charitable 22. 12. 2009 0 n.a.
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 30. 03. 2010 1 n.a.
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 01. 10. 2010 0 < 5%
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* 1 = equity stake increase, 0 = equity stake decrease; n.a. = not available
Table 9  (continued)
ISIN Firm Foundation type Date Event * Stake change
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 05. 11. 2010 1 n.a.
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 10. 01. 2011 0 < 5%
DE0005565204 Dürr Charitable 17. 02. 2011 0 > 10%
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 13. 08. 2012 1 n.a.
DE0008051004 Wüstenrot Charitable 06. 09. 2012 0 > 5%
DE0005772206 Fielmann Charitable 15. 11. 2012 1 > 10%
AT0000937503 Voestalpine Private 04. 12. 2012 0 n.a.
DE0005772206 Fielmann Charitable 10. 01. 2013 0 > 20%
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 25. 09. 2013 1 n.a.
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 04. 10. 2013 0 n.a.
DE0007164600 SAP Charitable 29. 10. 2013 0 n.a.
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 29. 10. 2013 0 n.a.
AT0000937503 Voestalpine Private 04. 11. 2013 1 n.a.
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 20. 11. 2013 1 > 5%
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 17. 12. 2013 0 n.a.
AT0000937503 Voestalpine Private 02. 01. 2014 0 n.a.
AT0TEAKHOLZ8 Teak Holz Private 17. 01. 2014 1 n.a.
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 05. 03. 2014 1 > 5%
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 15. 05. 2014 1 < 5%
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 10. 06. 2014 0 < 5%
DE0003304002 Software Charitable 23. 06. 2014 1 < 5%
AT0000937503 Voestalpine Private 06. 11. 2014 1 n.a.
AT0000937503 Voestalpine Private 23. 12. 2014 0 n.a.
DE0007164600 SAP Charitable 25. 11. 2015 1 n.a.
CH0360826991 Comet Private 22. 12. 2015 1 n.a.
CH0360826991 Comet Private 08. 03. 2016 0 n.a.
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 14. 04. 2016 1 n.a.
CH0003504856 Kuoni Private 02. 05. 2016 1 n.a.
CH0360826991 Comet Private 05. 05. 2016 0 n.a.
CH0360826991 Comet Private 07. 06. 2016 0 n.a.
DE0007500001 Thyssenkrupp Charitable 27. 06. 2016 1 n.a.
AT0000834007 Wolford Private 14. 11. 2016 0 n.a.
CH0360826991 Comet Private 19. 04. 2017 1 n.a.
CH0360826991 Comet Private 19. 05. 2017 0 n.a.
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